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RESPECT AND CONTEMPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,  
OR, IS JACK BALKIN HEARTBREAKING? 
ANDREW KOPPELMAN*
ELLIE [raising her head] Damn!  
 
MRS HUSHABYE.  Splendid!  Oh, what a relief!  I thought you 
were going to be broken-hearted.  Never mind me.  Damn 
him again.  
ELLIE.  I am not damning him: I am damning myself for be-
ing such a fool.  [Rising]  How could I let myself be taken in 
so?  [She begins prowling to and fro, her bloom gone, looking cu-
riously older and harder].  
MRS HUSHABYE [cheerfully]  Why not, pettikins?  Very few 
young women can resist Hector.  I couldn’t when I was your 
age.  He is really rather splendid, you know.  
ELLIE [turning on her]  Splendid!  Yes: splendid looking, of 
course.  But how can you love a liar?  
MRS HUSHABYE.  I dont know.  But you can, fortunately.  
Otherwise there wouldn’t be much love in the world.1
How many constitutions have we?  Part of what we hope for from 
constitutional law is that we be united, despite our political differenc-
es, by a unifying political charter.  John Rawls speaks for many when 
he writes that a well-ordered society “is a society all of whose members 
accept, and know that the others accept, the same principles (the 
same conception) of justice.”
 
2
In Constitutional Redemption, Jack Balkin argues that we have to 
give up on the Rawlsian aspiration, and learn to live in a world where, 
at a fundamental level, our fellow citizens are strange to us.
   
3
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  This is 
bound to try our faith in the regime.  Perhaps America is not what I 
thought it was.  Perhaps our marriage has always been a lie.  We must 
∗ John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Northwestern 
University.  Thanks to Jack Balkin and Valerie Quinn for comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. 1 GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, Heartbreak House, in COMPLETE PLAYS WITH PREFACES 
511 (1962). 
 2. John Rawls, A Kantian Conception of Equality, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 
254, 255 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) [hereinafter Rawls, Kantian Conception]. 
 3. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD (2011) [hereinafter  BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION]. 
 2012] IS JACK BALKIN HEARTBREAKING? 1127 
learn to live with heartbreak. 
I.   
I begin with a sordid tale of betrayal.  When the Supreme Court 
agreed to take the case of Bush v. Gore,4
So much for my good judgment.  My sense of betrayal was com-
pounded when many of my fellow law professors whom just happened 
to be loyal Republicans rushed to devise legitimizing rationales for the 
Court’s decisions.
 I was less concerned about the 
outcome than many of my friends who had voted for Gore.  These 
Justices are not crazy or evil, I said.  They are decent, intelligent 
people who happen to have different political views than we do.  They 
understand perfectly well that the worst possible outcome is a 5-4 de-
cision, with the majority consisting entirely of Justices nominated by 
Republican Presidents.  Such an outcome would thwart the counting 
of votes and hand the Presidency to a man who lost the popular vote.  
The Justices understand that the Constitution provides a detailed 
procedure for selecting the President, and that procedure does not 
authorize the Supreme Court to pick the President it likes.  That kind 
of abuse of the judicial office would be so obvious and egregious that 
the majority Justices would be disgraced, perhaps even impeached.  I 
believed that the Justices were conscientious people doing their best 
to follow the law.  
5
Betrayal presupposes trust.  The whole business would have been 
different had I regarded these judges and their supporters as subhu-
man or mad.  I felt betrayed because I thought that we had shared 
norms that went beyond our political differences.  What’s more dis-
heartening is that they actually believe their silly arguments, and con-
tinue to believe them to this day, long after the political stakes have 
dissipated. 
  It was obvious what my Republican colleagues 
(and, for that matter, the Justices in the majority) would have said 
had the Court engaged in such contortions on behalf of Democrats. 
Balkin sheds light on this sorry episode.  He offers a useful, albeit 
discouraging, anatomy of how it happens that our fellow citizens, 
whom we thought had shared common norms, could turn out to have 
allegiances that are entirely foreign to us.  His argument begins with 
Frank Michelman’s revision of Rawls.  Michelman does not agree that 
 
 4. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).   
 5.  Over the protests of my editors, I decline to name names—not to exculpate the 
guilty, but because there are so many culpable parties and I don’t want to leave anyone 
out.  You know who you are. 
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legitimacy depends on everyone in society sharing the same concep-
tion of justice.  On the contrary, Michelman argues that legitimacy is 
possible even if there is substantial disagreement about constitutional 
essentials.6  The American tendency to identify the Constitution with 
one’s own aspirations inevitably produces a multiplicity of readings.  
Everyone in the political community offers their own interpretation of 
the Constitution, one that interprets the system as conforming to 
their own visions of democracy and justice.  Those aspects of the re-
gime that do not so conform can be regarded as correctable mistakes.  
Each member of the community can read the Constitution with in-
terpretive charity, believing or hoping that these mistakes will be cor-
rected in the fullness of time.7
Balkin emphasizes the variety that this approach authorizes in a 
more inflammatory way than Michelman: 
   
Now, different people in the political community will have 
different notions of what those mistakes would be.  That is 
because different people will have different notions of the 
best interpretation of the Constitution and current practices.  
So one person might regard the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Roe v. Wade as a terrible mistake that will someday be cor-
rected, or as a demerit against an otherwise respect-worthy 
system, and will interpret the scope of the Roe decision and 
the principles announced in it very narrowly so that it does 
as little harm as possible.  Another person will regard Roe v. 
Wade as an important reason why the system is respect-
worthy—because it secures equality for women—and will in-
terpret the decision and its principles robustly.  As a result, 
there might be a large number of different portraits of the 
Constitution and the governmental system.8
What unites citizens, then, is “a common commitment to a common 
object of interpretation whose actual content, in turn, is contested.”
  
9
Balkin emphasizes that this is not an invitation to anarchy.  Ra-
ther, constitutional dissensus “may actually help promote and secure 
social cooperation and the goods of union.”
 
10
 
 6. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 
  Uncertainty about the 
future means that each of us can construct our own hopeful narrative 
3, at 41. 
 7. Frank I. Michelman, Ida’s Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (2003). 
 8. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 3, at 42 (footnote omitted). 
 9. Id. at 43.  The meaning of the canonical cases of constitutional law is similarly pro-
tean.  Id. at 206. 
 10. Id. at 43. 
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about the direction of the polity.  Our hope is reinforced if there is 
some way we can imagine that our story about the system’s history can 
prevail.  Constitutional politics in America is conducted through a 
clash of narratives of the American past, in which different social 
movements compete to make their views canonical.  These narratives 
about national identity certainly do the work that Balkin says they do.  
Here, as elsewhere,11
It is comforting to know that our faith at least has a common ob-
ject.  But do we know that?  Balkin borrows Sanford Levinson’s meta-
phor of constitutional protestantism.
 however, the news he is delivering may prove 
difficult to digest. 
12
The historian Arthur Lovejoy long ago made the disconcerting 
suggestion that “[t]he term ‘Christianity’ . . . is not the name for any 
single unit of the type for which the historian of specific ideas 
looks.”
  Protestantism’s model of di-
versity, however, is hub and spoke: manifold perceptions united by 
the fact that there really is only one God.  All Protestants worship the 
same God, and they have faith that it’s the same God. 
13  Rather, the history of Christianity is “a series of facts which, 
taken as a whole, have almost nothing in common except the 
name.”14  All Christians have held in common “the reverence for a 
certain person,” but Jesus Christ’s “nature and teaching . . . have been 
most variously conceived, so that the unity here too is largely a unity 
of name.”15  Jaroslav Pelikan responds that there is continuity as well 
as discontinuity (in a study that emphasizes the discontinuities over 
two millennia): “Yet Lovejoy would also have been obliged to ac-
knowledge that each of the almost infinite—and infinitely different—
ways of construing that name has been able to claim some warrant or 
other somewhere within the original portrait (or portraits) of Jesus in 
the Gospels.”16
 
 11. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Jack Balkin Is Disgusting, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 177 
(2010). 
  This, however, is a pretty faint continuity compared 
with the claim in the Epistle to the Hebrews: “Jesus Christ is the same 
yesterday and today and for ever. Do not be led away by diverse and 
 12. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 29–30 (rev. ed. 2011) (1988) (de-
fining constitutional protestantism to mean that each individual citizen has authority to 
interpret the meaning of the Constitution). 
 13. ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF AN 
IDEA 6 (1936). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. JAROSLAV PELIKAN, JESUS THROUGH THE CENTURIES: HIS PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF 
CULTURE 4 (1985). 
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strange teachings.”17
The news that we have not in fact been worshipping the same 
God is not minor news.  Samuel Freeman observes that the “overrid-
ing concern” of all of Rawls’s work “is to describe how, if at all, a well-
ordered society in which all agree on a public conception of justice is 
realistically possible.”
 
18  Rawls eventually acknowledged that there is “a 
family of reasonable though differing liberal political conceptions.”19  
Even if Rawls’s basic framework is accepted, “there are indefinitely 
many considerations that may be appealed to in the original position 
and each alternative conception of justice is favored by some consid-
erations and disfavored by others.”20  Freeman, who knew Rawls well, 
thinks that this concession “must have been an enormous disap-
pointment to him, for he had worked for nearly forty years trying to 
show how a well-ordered society where everyone accepts justice as 
fairness as its public charter is a realistic possibility.”21
II. 
  
LADY UTTERWORD. What an extraordinary way to behave!  
What is the matter with the man?  
ELLIE [in a strangely calm voice, staring into an imaginary dis-
tance] His heart is breaking: that is all. . . .  It is a curious sen-
sation: the sort of pain that goes mercifully beyond our pow-
ers of feeling.  When your heart is broken, your boats are 
burned: nothing matters any more.  It is the end of happi-
ness and the beginning of peace.22
To understand why Rawls was so disappointed, consider some re-
cent work in moral philosophy about the structure of respectful rela-
tions between human beings.  Stephen Darwall observes that we in-
evitably make moral claims upon one another and offers a 
philosophical analysis of this practice.
 
23
 
 17. Hebrews 13:8–9 (Revised Standard Version). 
  Darwall seeks to address not 
 18. SAMUEL FREEMAN, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS ON RAWLSIAN 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 4 (2007). 
 19. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxxvi (expanded ed. 1996) [hereinafter 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; see also John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in 
JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 573, 582 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) [hereinafter Rawls, 
The Idea of Public Reason Revisited].  
 20. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 133 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). 
 21. SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS xiii (2007) [hereinafter FREEMAN, RAWLS]. 
 22. SHAW, supra note 1, at 561. 
 23. STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 3, 5 (2006). 
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the practical problems of a pluralistic society, but some specialized, 
albeit important, questions of metaethics concerning what kind of 
entity a moral claim is.24
Darwall argues that the foundation of morality is what he calls 
“the second-person standpoint,” meaning “the perspective you and I 
take up when we make and acknowledge claims on one another’s 
conduct and will.”
  In this pursuit, Darwall sheds light on 
Rawls’s problem.  We strive for respectful relations, but we cannot 
achieve them without a specific common object of agreement.  The 
idea of respect is too fluid, and takes too many possible forms, to 
ground any but the most trivial specific moral claims. 
25  The practice of making claims upon others, a 
practice that Darwall thinks inseparable from human agency, has oth-
er pertinent presuppositions: that persons regard one another as free 
and rational, that addressees can freely and rationally accept the rea-
sons that are given (and any authority relations in which they are 
grounded), that legitimate demands are distinct from mere coercion, 
and that addresser and addressee share a common authority to make 
claims on one another.  The practice of making claims, therefore, also 
presupposes autonomy of the will and the common basic dignity of 
persons.26
Darwall’s account of the pragmatic presuppositions of the mak-
ing of claims is powerful, but vague.  These presuppositions are de-
manding: 
 
[W]e hold ourselves morally accountable to others when we 
impose demands on ourselves that we think it sensible to 
impose on anyone from a perspective that we can all share as 
free (second-personally competent) and rational.  And we 
presuppose that anyone we hold thus accountable is some-
one who can in principle also accept and impose these same 
demands on himself by taking up this impartial second-
person perspective and seeing the sense of imposing them 
on anyone.27
Darwall says little about the content of these demands.  They cannot 
be inconsistent with the common basic dignity of persons, but there 
are plenty of mutually inconsistent norms that satisfy that minimal re-
quirement.  It is satisfied, for example, when I tell the waiter that I 
 
 
 24. These questions surrounding the nature of moral claims are the subject of a sym-
posium on Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint in 118 ETHICS 8, 8–69 (2007). 
 25. DARWALL, supra note 23, at 3. 
 26. See id. at 269–76 (summarizing themes developed throughout the book). 
 27. Id. at 276. 
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want the eggs Benedict.28
The norms in question need not be law-like.  They need not be 
formulable in terms of universal principles.
  So long as you and I agree about the norms 
to which we are bound, and those norms are not inconsistent with the 
autonomy and dignity of either of us, we can stand in respectful rela-
tions with one another regardless of the content of our claims. 
29  Moreover, “nothing in 
the idea of moral obligation as involving reciprocal accountability 
rules out its scope or content extending beyond the needs and inter-
ests of free and rational individuals considered as such.”30  Our moral 
obligations “might include, for example, the protection of cultural 
treasures, wilderness, and/or the welfare of other sentient beings, 
quite independently of the relation any of these have to the interests 
of free and rational persons.”31
Darwall’s argument has important implications for Rawls’s aspira-
tion for “a society all of whose members accept, and know that the 
others accept, the same principles (the same conception) of justice.”
 
32
So long as we manage to agree on a standard by which we can le-
gitimately make claims upon one another, the basis of mutual respect 
could be the norms of well-run restaurants, the divine right of kings, 
the supreme authority of the Church, or the rules of football.  There 
is probably an infinite number of ways in which the norms that are 
the basis of respectful relations could be formulated, and an infinite 
number of ways in which those formulations could be interpreted in 
  
The principles of justice that Rawls outlines indeed can be the objects 
of overlapping consensus, and so be the basis of respectful relations 
that are more than a mere modus vivendi.  But so, Darwall has shown, 
can any other shared normative criteria. 
 
 28. Id. at 51.  The illustration, which is Darwall’s, is revealing, since the relationship 
between waiter and customer is typically one of dramatically asymmetrical power, at least 
when the tip is not automatically added to the bill.  Thanks to Bonnie Honig for this point. 
 29. They can, for example, be the particularistic judgments that Jonathan Dancy thinks 
constitute moral reasoning, see JONATHAN DANCY, ETHICS WITHOUT PRINCIPLES (2004), so 
long as they are able to be publicly articulated and accessible.  See DARWALL, supra note 23, 
at 156, 313–14.  Many particular judgments, not derived from rules, are publicly accessible 
and verifiable, for example, “the sky is blue.” 
 30. DARWALL, supra note 23, at 28. 
 31. Id.  There are, concededly, passages in which Darwall appears to have more Kan-
tian aspirations, seeking to ground “principles that we and [others] could will . . . as uni-
versal law” or “principles that are acceptable, or not reasonably rejectable, to each as free 
and rational agents.”  Id. at 300, 308.  But these claims sit uneasily beside the concessions 
to a more contingent ethics cited in the text.  Thanks to Sam Fleischacker for pointing out 
these passages. 
 32. Rawls, Kantian Conception, supra note 2, at 255. 
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specific cases.  Respect is, in short, fluid.33
The second-person standpoint, Darwall observes, can even be 
compatible with slavery, so long as the slaveholder believes that his 
slaves can be expected rationally to endorse his claim of authority 
over them.  Slaveholders have in fact believed this.
 
34  The implausibili-
ty of their reasons for so believing is not deducible from respect as 
such.  When the Athenians tried to explain to the Melians that the 
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must, they ma-
nifested respect of the Darwallian sort.35  Intelligent arguments 
against democratic government are of ancient vintage, and rebutting 
them depends on contingent empirical claims.36
 
 33. The dictionary definition of “fluid” applies here: “A substance that exists or is re-
garded as existing as a continuum characterized by low resistance to flow and the tendency 
to assume the shape of its container.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 516 (2d Col-
lege ed. 1985).  I develop a similar point about neutrality in The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 
REV. OF POL. 633, 638–39 (2004). 
 
 34. DARWALL, supra note 23, at 268. 
 35. See THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 400–08 (Rex Warner trans., 
1972).  There are limits to what can be said in this way without embarrassment.  Rudolf 
Hoess, who was in charge of Auschwitz, did not, when challenged by his victims, attempt to 
defend his deeds to them, though their reproaches clearly made an impression upon him.  
RUDOLF HOESS, COMMANDANT OF AUSCHWITZ: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF RUDOLF HOESS 
169–70 (Constantine FitzGibbon trans., 1959).  Conversely, the following story, recounted 
by Franz Stangl, the commandant of Treblinka, suggests that some people are incapable of 
embarrassment: 
There was one day when [Blau, a Jew who was kept alive and used as a cook, 
whom Stangl described as “the one I talked to most”] knocked at the door of my 
office about mid-morning and asked permission to speak to me.  He looked very 
worried.  I said, “Of course, Blau, come on in.  What’s worrying you?”  He said it 
was his eighty-year-old father; he’d arrived on that morning’s transport.  Was 
there anything I could do.  I said, “Really, Blau, you must understand, it’s im-
possible.  A man of eighty . . . .”  He said quickly that yes, he understood, of 
course.  But could he ask me for permission to take his father to the Lazarett [the 
fake hospital, where the old and sick were shot rather than gassed] rather than 
the gas chambers.  And could he take his father first to the kitchen and give him 
a meal.  I said, “You go and do what you think best, Blau.  Officially I don’t know 
anything, but unofficially you can tell the Kapo I said it was all right.”  In the af-
ternoon, when I came back to my office, he was waiting for me.  He had tears in 
his eyes.  He stood to attention and said, “Herr Hauptsturmführer, I want to 
thank you.  I gave my father a meal.  And I’ve just taken him to the Lazarett—it’s 
all over.  Thank you very much.”  I said, “Well, Blau, there’s no need to thank 
me, but of course if you want to thank me, you may.” 
GITTA SERENY, INTO THAT DARKNESS: FROM MERCY KILLING TO MASS MURDER 207–08 
(1974).  The Lazarett is described in id. at 165.  Stangl evidently supposed that he and Blau 
shared respect of the Darwallian kind.  An entire social world supported that supposition.  
What was off-the-wall, in that context, was the suggestion that Stangl might refrain from 
murdering the father of a man with whom he was friendly.  The real thoughts of Blau, who 
did not survive the camps, are unknowable.  See id. at 209. 
 36. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 6–9 (1989). 
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Darwall’s analysis implies that the role of shared norms in rela-
tions of mutual respect is analogous to the role of the sovereign in 
Hobbes’s Leviathan.  Hobbes thinks that in a well-functioning state 
there must be a sovereign and the sovereign must possess supreme 
authority.37
The fluidity of respect helps to explain why, in a 320-page mono-
graph on moral philosophy, Darwall does not offer a single example 
of how the standpoint he is defending can help to resolve an actual 
moral problem.  What he does show is the ubiquity of the second-
person standpoint.  Notably, it dominates “conversations in which 
participants display their reactions to others’ actions and feelings.”
  But this entails very little about who that sovereign ought 
to be.  Darwall shows that there must be shared norms.  But this en-
tails very little about what those norms ought to be. 
38  
In such conversations, “people negotiate questions of how it makes 
sense to respond to what people do and what norms for evaluating 
conduct it makes most sense to accept.”39  But if “much of what hu-
man beings discuss concerns what they and we can warrantedly expect 
and demand of one another,”40
Darwall’s analysis of respect sheds light on the problem of plural-
ism that so concerned Rawls.  Uncertainty about the specifics of 
shared norms can give rise to a distinctive form of conflict, and helps 
account for the intensity of that kind of conflict.  In order for you and 
me to exist in respectful relation to one another, Darwall shows, we 
must acknowledge a common norm.  But if you challenge (or misin-
terpret) a presently prevailing norm, and it is not apparent to me that 
you can offer a norm that can adequately replace it, then you are de-
nying (or so it may appear to me) the very possibility of respectful re-
lations between us.
 then it should be obvious that these 
discussions go considerably beyond the interests of free and rational 
persons as such, to an enormous range of other normative considera-
tions.  All of this discussion is necessary because the answers are not 
obvious.  Of course, this broadens the range and the stakes of possible 
disagreement. 
41
 
 37. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968) (1651). 
 
 38. DARWALL, supra note 23, at 170. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 171. 
 41. Law is often fraught in this way.  Clifford Geertz writes: 
Hardly anyone, even a marriage closer or a probate judge, is ready to die for 
pure procedure.  What is at risk, or felt to be, are the conceptions of fact and law 
themselves and of the relations they bear the one to the other—the sense, with-
out which human beings can hardly live at all, much less adjudicate anything, 
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III. 
HUNDING: Ich weiss ein wildes Geschlecht, 
nicht heilig ist ihm, was andren hehr: 
verhasst ist es allen und mir. 
 
[I know of a savage race, 
It does not hold holy what others revere: 
It is hated by all and me.]42
Hunding’s logic makes sense.  Not holding holy what others re-
vere makes one a savage.  It is a kind of treason against the moral or-
der.  Hunding’s error consists in his thinking that the moral order 
with which he is familiar is the only possible moral order.  As with 
Hobbes, the sovereign’s identity is less important than his undisputed 
authority. 
 
Darwall observes “that when second-personal reasons are prof-
fered, issues of respect are invariably at stake.  If the private fails to 
heed the sergeant’s orders, he doesn’t simply act contrary to a reason 
that sheds favorable light; he violates the order and so disrespects the 
sergeant and her authority.”43
In that sense, respect is elusive.  But in another sense, it is readily 
available.  All that is needed is some common basis for claims.  That 
does not sound so hard.  But the Balkin-Michelman claim about the 
Constitution as a basis for social unity gives rise to a puzzle: when eve-
ryone constructs their own private Constitution, is there any common 
basis for the claims we make upon one another? 
  The appropriate reactive attitude is 
one that demands that the violator acknowledge the authority that he 
has failed to respect.  Obviously, if the private persists in doubting 
that the sergeant has the authority she claims, they have a problem.  
Respect between the sergeant and the private demands that they ac-
knowledge a common norm.  Yet the idea of respect between free and 
rational beings cannot tell them whether it is appropriate to designate 
people as sergeants and privates at all, or who is the sergeant and who 
is the private, or what demands a sergeant is or is not entitled to make 
of a private. 
Balkin thinks that what provides the necessary unity, in modern 
 
that truth, vice, falsehood, and virtue are real, distinguishable, and appropriately 
aligned. 
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 
231 (2000). 
 42. RICHARD WAGNER, DIE WALKÜRE act 1, sc. 2 (author’s translation). 
 43. DARWALL, supra note 23, at 60. 
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America, is fidelity to the Constitution’s original meaning.  “Protes-
tant constitutionalism needs something that gives people something 
to rally around; something that is a common object of interpretation 
even though everyone’s interpretations of that object differ.  Faith in 
a process divorced from a central text may be altogether too abstract 
to serve this function.”44  The Constitution’s text provides us with a 
language for evaluating proposals for social change.  “Appeals to re-
turn and reform, and to the text as the symbol and site of these ap-
peals, are the standard way of engaging in protestant constitutional 
argument in America’s democratic constitutional culture.”45
Given the proliferation of interpretations, however, how can a 
text offer the necessary unity?  As long ago as 1856, one newspaper 
editor observed: “The Constitution threatens to be a subject of infi-
nite sects, like the Bible.”
  The 
constant generation of new rhetorics of return to the unpolluted 
source of constitutional authority keeps the regime legitimate because 
it makes the regime responsive to the needs of the time. 
46  Balkin writes that the text symbolizes 
popular sovereignty precisely because its public character “authorizes 
people from all walks of life to claim the right to interpret it.”47  This 
does not produce a Rawlsian social union:  “the life of the Constitu-
tion has been perpetual disagreement, not pacifying consensus.”48  
Hobbes, to the contrary, thinks that we need a sovereign, not a unify-
ing text, precisely because a text is susceptible to too many different 
interpretations.49  His fear of chaos has contemporary echoes,50
 
 44. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 
 nota-
3, at 246. 
 45. Id. at 234. 
 46. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN 
AMERICAN CULTURE 103 (1986).   
 47. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 3, at 237. 
 48. Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 101, 147. 
 49. Thus Hobbes’s reflection on the radical Protestant reliance on scripture during the 
English Civil War: 
[A]fter the Bible was translated into English, every man, nay, every boy and 
wench, that could read English, thought they spoke with God Almighty, and un-
derstood what he said, when by a certain number of chapters a day they had read 
the Scriptures once or twice over . . . .  [T]he reverence and obedience due to 
the Reformed Church here, and to the bishops and pastors therein, was cast off; 
and every man became a judge of religion, and an interpreter of the Scriptures 
to himself. . . .  [T]his licence of interpreting the Scripture was the cause of so 
many several sects, as having lain hid till the beginning of the late King’s reign, 
did then appear to the disturbance of the commonwealth. 
THOMAS HOBBES, BEHEMOTH, OR, THE LONG PARLIAMENT 21–22 (Ferdinand Tonnies ed., 
1990) (1681).  The inevitable fragmentation created by reliance on a written text is, per-
haps, the only point of agreement between Hobbes and Levinson.  See LEVINSON, supra 
note 12, at 17. 
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bly in many modern originalists’ search for the holy grail of an inter-
pretive method that leaves no room for judicial discretion.51
The fear of social division also underlies Rawls’s idea of public 
reason as a basis for resolving the bewildering diversity of comprehen-
sive views.
  
52  The problem Rawls faced, of how to cope with religious 
diversity, sheds light on our problem of how to cope with the diversity 
of constitutional interpretations.53  In his last writings, he conceded 
that, even with respect to political fundamentals, citizens may present 
political arguments based on their comprehensive views, “provided 
that in due course public reasons, given by a reasonable political con-
ception, are presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehen-
sive doctrines are introduced to support.”54  There is no formula for 
what the phrase “in due course” means; such matters “must be worked 
out in practice and cannot feasibly be governed by a clear family of 
rules given in advance.”55
 
 50. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) (claim-
ing that Americans’ “belief in themselves as . . . [a people who live according to the rule of 
law] is not readily separable from their understanding of the Court invested with the au-
thority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others for their constitu-
tional ideals”). 
  Rawls’s position thus converges with that of 
Christopher Eberle: The religious citizen (whose reasons, in Rawls, 
 51. Many modern originalists have abandoned the quest, though in its popular ver-
sions originalism continues to advertise itself as providing this constraint.  See Thomas B. 
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713 (2011). 
 52. “[I]n discussing constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice we are not to 
appeal to comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines—to what we as individuals or 
members of associations see as the whole truth . . . .”  RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra 
note 19, at 224–25.  “[C]itizens are to conduct their fundamental discussions within the 
framework of what each regards as a political conception of justice based on values that 
others can reasonably be expected to endorse.”  Id. at 226.  For a fuller exposition of 
Rawls’s idea of public reason, see FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 21, at 381–415.   
The term public reason was coined by Hobbes, who understood it rather differently:   
[W]e are not every one, to make our own private Reason, or Conscience, [the 
arbiter of moral and religious questions] but the Publique Reason that is, the 
reason of Gods Supreme Lieutenant, Judge; and indeed we have made him 
Judge already, if wee have given him a Soveraign power, to doe all that is neces-
sary for our peace and defence. 
HOBBES, supra note 37, at 477–78.  Hobbes thought that public reason could not serve its 
unifying function if everyone got to interpret it for themselves. 
 53. The analogy with religion is particularly salient because, in the modern nation-
state, the imagined community is the object of quasi-religious veneration.  See WILLIAM T. 
CAVANAUGH, THE MYTH OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE: SECULAR IDEOLOGY AND THE ROOTS OF 
MODERN CONFLICT (2009); Jeffrey James Poelvoorde, The American Civil Religion and the 
American Constitution, in HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION PROTECT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM? 
141 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1987); Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in 
SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 31 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998). 
 54. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 19, at xlix–l. 
 55. Rawls, Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 19, at 592. 
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are paradigmatically nonpublic) can offer her religiously based politi-
cal views freely so long as she continues to pursue a search for public 
reasons and thinks that it will eventually be possible to provide 
them.56
Jeffrey Stout argues that when Rawls proposes that social unity be 
based on principles that no one could reasonably reject, “[Rawls] has 
drastically underestimated the range of things that socially coopera-
tive individuals can reasonably reject.”
  Public discourse will thus inevitably include arguments that 
seem to many citizens to be off-the-wall.  But the imperatives of rhe-
toric will have some disciplining effect: my views may be off-the-wall, 
but I have a powerful interest in preventing them from seeming so. 
57  The same burdens of judg-
ment that make the doctrine of reasonable pluralism plausible also 
suggest that we will not be able to devise a social contract that fixes 
the terms of cooperation in advance.  Such a social contract would 
not be accepted by all reasonable persons.  Moreover, it is not the on-
ly possible basis of cooperation.  Cooperation occurs whenever we ex-
change reasons with one another.  This can be done without ever rely-
ing on universally acceptable premises.  I can try to take seriously the 
point of view that each of my fellow citizens holds, addressing them 
one at a time.58  My discourse inevitably will often be secular, in that I 
will avoid reliance on religious premises that I know my interlocutors 
do not accept.59  But this is a response to a rhetorical imperative, not a 
moral one.60  In Stout’s version, political discourse is exactly the con-
flict of irreconcilable moral views with no pre-existing common de-
nominator that Rawls fears.61
 
 56. CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS (2002). The 
convergence is noted in Martha Nussbaum, Rawls’s Political Liberalism. A Reassessment, 24 
RATIO JURIS. 1, 16–19 (2011). 
  Common ground, the basis of Darwal-
lian respect, gets constructed on an ad hoc basis with each 
interlocutor as one strives on each political occasion to persuade a 
majority (at least) to support one’s proposal.  Constitutional dis-
course, which imagines a unitary community that continues over gen-
 57. JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 70 (2004). 
 58. Id. at 72–73. 
 59. See id. at 92–117. 
 60. Kwame Anthony Appiah similarly suggests that “Rawlsian structures about the ideal 
of public reason are perhaps best interpreted as debating tips: as rhetorical advice about 
how best, within a plural polity, to win adherents and influence policies.”  KWAME A. 
APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 81 (2007).  Rawls sometimes endorses a similar view.  See 
Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 19, at 592. 
 61. Clifford Geertz likewise thinks that law does not depend on normative consensus, 
and that a conception of law that presupposes that it does “leaves law the most powerful 
where the least needed, a sprinkler system that turns off when the fire gets too hot.”  
GEERTZ, supra note 41, at 217. 
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erations and stands for some very specific shared ideals, is a tool in 
that enterprise. 
IV. 
ELLIE [staring at her thoughtfully] Theres something odd 
about this house, Hesione, and even about you.  I dont know 
why I'm talking to you so calmly.  I have a horrible fear that 
my heart is broken, but that heartbreak is not like what I 
thought it must be.  
MRS HUSHABYE . . . It’s only life educating you, pettikins.62
Balkin observes that the boundary between frivolous and serious 
legal arguments is crucial to sustaining faith in the rule of law.  “[T]he 
lawyer who makes a frivolous legal argument has done more than 
make a mistake; he or she has disrespected a crucial boundary that 
undergirds the system of legal faith and faith in the legal system.”
 
63  If 
that boundary can be moved by politics, “our faith in law might well 
be shaken.”64
The faith that is shaken, however, is not in law so much as in our 
fellow citizens, who are so deluded that they cannot see when an ar-
gument is frivolous.  We aim to live in respectful relations with them, 
but their delusions do not inspire respect.  It is possible to have faith 
in, or at least to hope for, the possibility that they will improve.
 
65
Hilary Putnam, reflecting on the callous minimal-state beliefs of 
his Harvard colleague Robert Nozick, observed that, while he res-
pected Nozick’s mind and character, “I feel contempt (or something 
in that ballpark) for a certain complex of emotions and judgments in 
him.”
  In 
the case of the defenders of Bush v. Gore, however, I see no evidence 
that they are capable of conversion.  We never really believed in the 
same things.  Our marriage is a lie.  And you should not marry some-
one intending to change them. 
66
 
 62. SHAW, supra note 
  There is, Putnam argued, “no contradiction between having a 
fundamental liking and respect for someone and still regarding some-
1, at 512. 
 63. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 3, at 88. 
 64. Id. at 89. 
 65. As Balkin states: 
When we have faith in others in downtrodden circumstances—a drug addict, a 
recidivist criminal or an alcoholic—we do not pretend that they are something 
they are not: physically and spiritually healthy.  We must understand them for 
what they are now, and see the possibilities of what they could be. 
Id. at 122. 
 66. HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 165 (1981). 
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thing in him as an intellectual and moral weakness.”67  The proper 
stance is an “ambivalent attitude of respectful contempt.”68
Respectful contempt is what constitutional discourse is nearly 
guaranteed to produce.  Law is, of course, open-textured, and occa-
sional disagreement about its content is inevitable.
 
69  In constitutional 
law, however, our readings of the texts tend to be closely tied to our 
most urgent aspirations, so that people with different aspirations will 
inevitably read the Constitution differently.  Americans tend to merge 
the Constitution with some of our deepest hopes for ourselves and 
our society, and constitutional language is, in American culture, a 
conventional way of communicating those hopes.  If those hopes imp-
ly a constitutional argument that is off-the-wall, then we must do what 
we can to shift the cultural boundaries of what is off-the-wall.70  As 
Balkin observes, we feel bound by the handiwork of the Framers of 
the Constitution because we in some way identify with them, and feel 
that their accomplishments are ours.71  This identification “is always 
premised on an interpretation of and selective identification with the 
past,” as well as a distinctive imagination of “a continuing political 
project that extends into the future.”72  Originalism is a claim to base 
one’s argument of the moment on continuity with that past.  In that 
sense, everyone who makes claims about American constitutional law 
is an originalist.  But this originalism is a rhetorical style, not an algo-
rithm for certainty in constitutional meaning.73
This problem would go away if we would only demote the Consti-
tution to the status of ordinary law, which has nothing to do with our 
 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 166.  Perhaps it is a hopeful sign that, in the end, Nozick was converted.  See 
ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 286–87 (1989) (“The libertarian position I once 
propounded now seems to me seriously inadequate, in part because it did not fully knit 
the humane considerations and joint cooperative activities it left room for more closely 
into its fabric.”). 
 69. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128–36 (2d ed. 1994). 
 70. I have attempted to do this myself when I have argued (persuading hardly anyone) 
that the right to abortion is protected by the Thirteenth Amendment.  See Andrew Kop-
pelman, Forced Labor Revisited: The Thirteenth Amendment and Abortion, in THE PROMISES OF 
LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
226 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010) (noting the barely visible scholarly reaction to Andrew 
Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480 
(1990)). 
 71. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 3, at 51–52. 
 72. Id. at 54. 
 73. See Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, the Thirteenth Amendment, and Abortion, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
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transcendent aspirations.74  If that happened, originalism might be 
more plausible,75
We don’t have to be nasty about it.  Rawls’s political liberalism is 
first and foremost a response to a problem: “how is it possible for 
there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citi-
zens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philo-
sophical, and moral doctrines?”
 but it also would not matter so much.  We would be 
having a technical dispute about the sources of law, of interest only to 
specialists.  This would, however, require a radical reimagining of the 
place of the Constitution in American culture.  It is unlikely to hap-
pen.  And so long as it does not happen, the Constitution will be a site 
of disrespect and betrayal. 
76  That is a different question from 
how there can be a society where everyone believes the same things.  
The practice of sharing a social world with those who fundamentally 
differ from us is part of what social life is always about.  As the Put-
nam-Nozick relationship shows us, academics who worry about the so-
cially destructive power of intractable disagreements routinely enjoy 
schmoozing with those whom they regard as deeply misguided about 
morally weighty matters.77  The delicate combination of respect and 
contempt that Putnam describes is the normal attitude of citizens to-
ward one another in a democracy.78
We seek by persuasion to respectfully teach our fellow citizens to 
be less contemptible.  The modalities of constitutional law are among 
the tools of persuasion.
  Can’t we all just not get along? 
79
 
 74. See Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman: Originalism and the (Merely) Human Constitu-
tion, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 189 (2010); Adrian Vermeule, Ideals and Idols, NEW REPUBLIC, 
June 8, 2011 (reviewing JACK BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION (2011)), available at 
http://www.tnr.com/book/review/constitutional-redemption-jack-balkin. 
  The life of constitutional law has not been 
logic, for there often are no undisputed major premises from which 
to begin.  It has been rhetoric.  The aim of the rhetoric is to bind our 
fragmented polity together into what we can persuade ourselves is an 
 75. Or it might not.  See Robert Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitu-
tion, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A 
DEBATE 78 (2011); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 13–25 
(2001); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987). 
 76. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 19, at 4. 
 77. Jeremy Waldron also points this out in his book, Law and Disagreement, at 228 
(1999). 
 78. This is emphasized in Martin Redish’s recent work on democratic theory.  See Mar-
tin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Cen-
tral Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303 
(2009). 
 79. The canonical catalogue of these tools is PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: 
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982). 
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ancient unity.80  Balkin observed long ago, anticipating Darwall, that 
transcendent ideals of justice “seem to spring forth magically from the 
rhetorical encounter.”81
My discussion so far has largely neglected the role of hope in the 
constitutional narrative.
 
82  That narrative, we have seen, is full of gaps 
and discontinuities, but gap-closing is precisely what hope does.  Jona-
than Lear can even write of “radical hope,” which “is directed toward 
a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand 
what it is.”83  Hope is a universal sealant that can fill whatever cracks 
exist in the structure of social solidarity.  Charles Taylor observes: 
“Hope can only exist if you are uncertain about a desired outcome.  If 
it’s really a sure thing, your anticipation of it can’t be hope.”84
As Balkin writes, constitutional protestantism “offers a way for in-
dividuals and groups to pledge faith in the Constitution’s restoration 
and redemption, even when judges and government officials do not 
heed their views.  It holds out the hope of a Constitution that will 
someday be redeemed.”
 
85  Hope can take the place of a rule in the 
structure of Darwallian respect.  It is the Hobbesian sovereign.86  If 
you betray me today, I can still hope that your future self will learn to 
accept and conform to the legitimate sources of authority that today 
you outrageously refuse to acknowledge.87
 
 80. The invention of ancient unities is, of course, what the nation-state is all about.  
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD 
OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 2006). 
  (I can even bring some in-
 81. J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 149 (1998). 
 82. As Jack Balkin put it in conversation, after reading an earlier draft of this essay: 
“Why so sad, dude?” 
 83. JONATHAN LEAR, RADICAL HOPE: ETHICS IN THE FACE OF CULTURAL DEVASTATION 
103 (2006). 
 84. Taylor is uncertain whether radical hope “can be sustained without some kind of 
formulated faith in something, whether religious or secular—faith in God, or in History, 
or in our own resources, or in human resilience.”  Any formulation, however, will be in-
adequate to that toward which it points.  It is part of our nature that “we long for things 
that we do not yet fully understand.”  Charles Taylor, A Different Kind of Courage, N.Y. REV. 
OF BOOKS (Apr. 26, 2007) (reviewing JONATHAN LEAR, RADICAL HOPE (2006)), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2007/apr/26/a-different-kind-of-courage. 
 85. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 3, at 234–35.  Because hope is a 
response to uncertainty, Balkin has no argument with which to reject the hopelessness of 
the more recent work of Sanford Levinson, who now thinks that the Constitution we have 
inherited is irredeemably dysfunctional.  Id. at 75–76; LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 246–55. 
 86. Without the inconveniences: Hobbes’s sovereign might not act as we hoped.  But 
the Constitution might not either.  Hope can be misplaced.  You really should not go back 
to the husband who has been abusing you for years. 
 87. A similar hope has a similar role in the legal philosophy of Ronald Dworkin, who 
argues that there are no gaps in the law if one understands the law to be oriented toward 
moral purposes.  RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
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terpretive charity to your implausible interpretations.88  As Aquinas 
noted, faith and hope beget charity.89
When we tell competing histories, for example, about Bush v. 
Gore, we aim to reconstitute what is or is not frivolous and therefore 
contemptible.  Justice Scalia, challenged about the decision, offered 
the charming advice, “get over it.”
) 
90  One reason that it is hard to get 
over it is that, if this precedent stands as legitimate, then the Court is 
authorized to do this kind of thing again.91
Only love can break your heart.
  The accepted national 
narrative authorizes future actions.  Unless the Court is properly 
shamed for its bad behavior, it will be able to get away with anything.  
Perhaps paradoxically, accusations of betrayal can be themselves 
community-building.  They police the boundaries of the frivolous and 
aim at a new consensus with our unruly, unreliable, contemptible fel-
low citizens.  If we were indifferent to them and their ridiculous be-
liefs, if we did not care, then indeed constitutional law would be a 
more placid business.   
92
 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996).  This seamlessness, notoriously, is produced at a cost of 
indeterminacy and enormous judicial discretion.  The Darwallian question, whether res-
pectful relations can be maintained when the law is thus indeterminate, is an empirical 
one: can a society carry on on these terms?  The answer is that it had better be able to, be-
cause indeterminacy and discretion are endemic to any possible legal system. 
 
 88. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 87 (2011). 
 89. THOMAS AQUINAS, I–II SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 65, art. 5 (R.J. Henle, S.J., ed. trans., 
1993) (1267–1273). 
 90. Interview by Lesley Stahl with Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, on 60 Minutes (CBS broadcast Apr. 27, 2008), transcript available 
at Justice Scalia On the Record (Feb. 11, 2009, 3:03 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories 
/2008/04/24/60minutes/main4040290_page3.shtml.  
 91. By the time this Essay is in print, you will know whether the Court has done it again 
in the context of health care reform.  See Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: 
The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2011), available 
at http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/04/26/koppelman.html. 
 92. Neil Young, Only Love Can Break Your Heart, on AFTER THE GOLD RUSH (Reprise 
Records 1970). 
